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CENTRAL

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BULLETIN



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25X1 Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004800260001-0 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 1 December 1959 25X1 DAILY BRIEF 25X I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC II. ASIA-AFRICA Japan: There has been widespread unfavorable public reaction in Japan to the serious disorders which occurred on 27 November in Tokyo during leftist-sponsored demonstrations against the US-Japanese Security Treaty. This is discrediting the leftists and may impair their ability to rally support for their campaign against the treaty. Ambassador Mac-Arthur reports that there is near unanimity of public comment that a basic threat to Japanese democratic institutions now exists and should be curbed. Moderate elements among the Socialists and in labor circles are also expected to gain vis-a-vis the extreme: left. 25**X** Indonesia: Divergence between government policies and Indonesian Communist party interests, evidenced in the party's support of Peiping on major current issues, has placed the party oK in an embarrassing position. The party is the only significant political element in Indonesia opposing the ban on alien retailers in rural areas. It has also revealed itself as being out of

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line with other government moves indicating adoption of a firmer attitude toward the USSR following recent rejection of Soviet

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bloc overtures to improve relations.

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DAILY BRIEF

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Support of Peiping Places Indonesian Communists In Awkward Position

Divergence between Indonesian Government policies and Indonesian Communist party interests has placed the party in an increasingly embarrassing position as the party persists in supporting Peiping on major current issues. The Communists are the only significant political element in Indonesia to oppose the government's ban on alien retailers in rural areas, and their approval of a parliamentary recommendation for the speedy convening of a second Asian-African conference to discuss disputes in the area came only after considerable objection. In addition, the Communists obstructed a parliamentary resolution calling for the peaceful settlement of the Chinese-Indian border problem, finally approving it only with the assertion that Peiping was in no way at fault.

Communist opposition to the ban on alien retailers has been vigorous and persistent, culminating on 22 November in a special politburo statement which denounced the ban as 'reckless and chauvinistic" and a means of undermining Sino-Indonesian friendship. The Indonesian Department of Foreign Affairs replied on 25 November that the government's decree will be implemented despite Communist party objections and that "it is a secondary question whether the government is assisted in this task by any party or not."

Communist party Secretary General Aidit, commenting on the suggested Asian-African conference, stated on 25 November that such a conference should not be held at this time since "many contradictions now exist among the Asian-African countries." He said currently strained relations should be settled bilaterally.

The principal significance of the Indonesian Communist party's current role is its possible effect on President Sukarno. Sukarno, although aware of the Communist threat to his own position, has been reluctant to challenge the party openly or to regard it as instructed by Moscow and Peiping. He has given his full support to the ban against Chinese retailers but is not known to have commented on Communist party opposition.

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Nepalese Prime Minister Plans Official Visits to India And Communist China

Nepal's Prime Minister Koirala told a press conference on 29 November that he will visit Communist China in February or early March. Peiping had extended an invitation in September, and the Chinese ambassador to Nepal recently suggested that Koirala go to Peiping to work out final details of China's offer to expand its economic aid with a grant of \$8,000,-000 in cash. This grant, which would boost Chinese aid to Nepal to more than \$20,000,000, apparently is designed to speed construction projects under Peiping's 1956 grant and to provide a timely demonstration of Chinese "good will" in dealing with neighboring states.

During his visit, Koirala probably will press for a joint declaration accepting the "existing" border between Nepal and Tibet. He apparently feels that such a commitment would stave off incidents like those which have occurred recently along the Indian-Chinese frontier. Peiping refused in September to agree to a declaration along these lines proposed by a visiting Nepalese delegation, and will almost certainly do so again. The Chinese, however, will want to reassure Katmandu that there will be no incursions and may agree to "negotiations" which Peiping will prolong and use for propaganda purposes without coming to a definitive settlement.

Koirala also announced on 29 November that in response to Prime Minister Nehru's invitation he will make a state visit to India late in January. The Nepalese leader apparently intends to reassure Nehru and to coordinate his government's views on the border problem in advance of his trip to Peiping, while at the same time maintaining an independent position with regard to the Sino-Indian dispute. In referring to Nehru's reaffirmation of 27 November, that any aggression against Nepal would be considered an attack on India, Koirala described this as an "expression of friendship," but commented that Katmandu "would decide if there were aggression." Koirala also denied rumors that an Indian Army division was being sent to Nepal to strengthen border defenses.

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Greece Expels Soviet Diplomat

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Soviet Ambassador to Greece Sergeyev has been warned by a Greek Foreign Ministry official that certain Soviet Embassy "activities" will no longer be tolerated. He was informed that Soviet Second Secretary Ivan Mayorov has been declared persona non grata, Second Secretary Vassily Vorobev is under observation, and that certain of his own activities are unacceptable. Sergeyev, according to a Greek report, engaged in considerable bluster when his subordinates were named, but became "grimly silent" when his own name was mentioned. The Greek Government does not intend to make public the action taken against Mayorov, who recently left Athens on vacation and will not be permitted to return.

Both Mayorov and Vorobev are believed to be Soviet intelligence officers; Mayorov has been particularly active in internal Greek politics during his five years in Athens. The Greek Government considered expelling the two men last spring but postponed action--reportedly on direct orders from Premier Karamanlis.

The Greek Government's present action is in line with recent negative responses from Athens to persistent Soviet bloc efforts to promote better relations with Greece with a view to neutralizing it. Greek Foreign Minister Averoff has pointed out that increasingly serious economic problems make the country potentially vulnerable to Soviet moves, particularly in the economic field. The Greek Government, however, has recently reemphasized its close ties with the West and increased pressure on internal Communist-front elements, and now apparently is seeking to reduce the possibility of subversive activities by the members of the Soviet Embassy in Athens.

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